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ACTIVIST MONETARY POLICY, IMPERFECTCAPITAL
MOBILITY, AND THE OVERSHOOTING HYPOTHESIS
ABS TRACT
The hypothesis of exchange rateovershooting is investigated in the context
of a model that incorporates activist
monetary policy, variable output,
imperfect capital mobility, and slowprice adjustment. Monetary policy
which accommodates prices and/or interestrates is shown to increase the
likelihood of undershooting.Using constrained maximum likelihoodmethods,
the model is estimated forGermany and Japan since the advent ofgeneralized
floating in 1973. Based on the estimatedparameter values, the mark exhibits
overshooting while the yen is characterizedby undershooting. The constraints
implied by the model cannot (by likelihood
ratio tests) be rejected at standard






After a decade of experience with
flexible exchange rates, it isclear
that exchange rate variabilityexceeds national price levelvariability.
The resultant variability of the "reaPexchange rate has had important
macroeconomic ramifications during the 1970's.These ramifications, often
considered adverse bygovernments, have led some analysts to reconsider
their support for flexibleexchange rates and/or to advocate increased
intervention in the foreignexchange market.
The best known explanation for
high exchange rate variability s
Dornbusch's (1976) overshootinghypothesis. According to thishypothesis,
when (for example) themoney supply permanently increases, theexchange
rate will first depreciate bymore than its long run depreciation, andthen
appreciate back to the steady state. In
contrast, undershooting occurs
when, following the money supplyincrease, the exchange rate firstdepreci—
ates by less than its long run
depreciation, followed by further depre-
ciation until the steady state isattained.
This paper considers threereasons why, in an economy which would
Otherwise be characterized by
overshooting, undershooting may occur:
imperfect capital mobility, variableoutput, and activist monetary policy.
The analysis builds on previouswork, especially Frenkel and Rodriguez
(1982), who show that sufficiently
imperfect capital mobility cancause
exchange rate undershooting, Dornbusch(1976), who shows thatovershooting
is not necessary if output isvariable, Papell (1982), who demonstrates
that monetary policy whichaccommodates prices can causeundershootjng,an
Frenkel (1983), who advocates
using monetary policy to target both interest
rates and exchange rates. Thepaper shows, both theoretically and empiri-
cally, how these factors combine toproduce over- or uridershooting.
1The model is then estimated for Germanyand Japan, using quarterly
data from 1973-1981. The major findingis that, based on the estimated
parameter values, the DeutscheMark exhibits overshooting while the yenis
characterized by undershooting. The model isestimated by constrained
maximum likelihood methods, with theconstraints caused by the form of the
structural equations and assumption ofrational expectations. It is
noteworthy that, using likelihood ratio tests,the constraints cannot be
rejected at standard significancelevels for either country. This is far
more empirical support than can generallybe claimed for open economy
macroeconomic models using data from the 1970's.
The paper is organized as follows. Themodel is presented in Section
II. Imperfect capital mobility, variable output,and activist monetary
policy are shown to combine to produce over-or undershooting in Section
III and the model is estimated in SectionIV. Conclusions and extensions
are presented in Section V.
II. The Model
The model is based on Dornbusch (1976), althoughit differs from his
work in a number of respects. It is a two-countrymodel, incorporating
variable output and imperfect capital mobility,in which the domestic and
foreign money supplies are determined
endogenously. The two country
specification, rather than a single,small country specifications was
chosen for two reasons. First, the small countryspecification requires
making exogeneity assumptions regarding
foreign prices and interest rates
which cannot be supportedempirically) Second, the two country specifica-
tion allows for the foreign money supply, aswell as the domestic money
supply, to be determined endogenously.This is shown below to be quite
important, both theoretically and empirically,regarding the existence of




















m is the logarithm of the domestic money supply,
y is the logarithm of domestic real output,
i is the domestic nominal interestrate,
r is the domestic real interest rate,
e is the logarithm of the exchange rate (domesticcurrency
price of foreign exchange),
*associatedwith a variable indicates that it refersto
the foreign country,
q is the logarithm of the ratio of domestic to foreign
prices, i.e., q =p-pwhere p is the logarithm of
the domestic price lvel,
"overa variable indicates deviation from thesteady state
level,
y0 is the exogenous component of output,
m0 is the exogenous component of the money supply,
e+1 is the expectation of the exchange rate for period t+1,
conditional on information available inperiod t,
the c's are random variables, whichmay be serially correlated.
The specifications of the asset marketsare conventional. Supply and
demand for real balances for eachcountry are equated in equilibrium, and













where1b' m* =a'i- a1* + /trtlt2t '2t
Equation (1) is obtained by subtracting (ib)from (la) and defining =
- 2tThe income elasticities and interest rate semi-elasticitiesof
the two countries need to be equated for the model tobe tractable. This
is the principal drawback to using the two—countrymodel.3
Real output in each country depends on the relative priceof domestic
and foreign goods, the real interest rate, an exogenousterm and a stochas-
tic disturbance term. If the relative price of foreign goodsis high, (et
>q,i.e., et +p>p.1.),domestic output is above and foreign output is
below the values that would be attained under instantaneous purchasing
power parity. While deviationsfrom purchasing power parity are allowed in









Equation(2) is obtained by setting a3 =b2
+b3,c2t =3t4t'and by
subtraction
If capital were perfectly mobile, the domestic interestrate would
equal the foreign interest rate plus the expectedrate of depreciation. In
order to incorporate imperfect capital mobility into our analysis, weadopt
the specification used by Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982),The current




whereTt is the current account surplus(not in logarithms). Capital flows
are assumed to depend on the difference betweenrates of return on secu-





where C. is the capital account surplus (not inlogarithms). In the
absence of Central Bank intervention, balance ofpayments equilibrium
requires that the sum of the current and capital account
surpluses equal
zero. This is represented in equation (3), witha5 =b4/b5and =
—(n5t+n6)Ib5.Notice that if capital were perfectlymobile, b5 =
impliesthat a5 = =
Asin Dornbusch (1976), the rate of inflation ineach country is
assumed to depend on excess demand in thegoods market,6










-a4*are the steady state levels of
output. The steady state real interest rates,and r,areequal because
the long run equilibrium is assumed to be characterizedby constant ex-
change rates and prices. The assumption ofpurchasing power parity then
implies uncovered interest rate parity, which in turncauses nominal
interest rates to be equated. Real interestrates are then equated by the
Fisher relation.
Substituting (2a,b) into (4a,b), and subtracting (4b) from(4a), we






+- bn— Notethat we have
imposed the constraint thatb7 =b8,which is necessary because the
real interest rate enters equation (4) indifference form, ona7 but not
on a6. If applied consistently, equation (4) wouldread,
(4c) ÷1 -= b7a3(e-- b7a4(r-r)
+c4t.
When the model was estimated with thisconstraint, it was clearly rejected
5in favor of the model reported in the text. We felt thatthe
misspecification from the unsupported constraint was worsethan the incon-
sistency in the less constrainted model. It shouldalso be noted that both
domestic and foreign prices are pre-determined.7
The money supply for each country depends on the exchange rate,the
difference between domestic and foreign prices, and the interestrate
differential.8 If the exchange rate depreciates (increases), the domestic
money supply is accommodative i.f a8 >0,offsetting if a8 <0.Thus, an
offsetting rule would decrease the money supply in responseto a depre-
ciation in order to cause the exchange rate to appreciate.For the foreign
country, since a depreciation is a decrease in e, anaccommodative rule
consists of a11 >0,an offsetting rule of a11 <0.Mussa (1981b) argues
that the behavior o-f exchange rates has influenced the conductof monetary
policy of a number of countries since generalized floating beganin 1973.
If the logarithm of the ratio of domestic to foreign pricesincreases
monetary policy is accommodative if 89 and/or a12 >0,offsetting if a9
and/or a12 <0.The money supply is constrained to respond to the price
ratio, rather than to the levels separately, because, inthe reduced form
of the model, prices appear only in ratio form. While allowingthe money
supplies to respond separately to domestic and foreignlevels would be
desirable, it would make the model analyticallyintractable.10 Taylor
(1980), using annual data for the period 1955—1978, provideseconometric
evidence that the money supply accommodated the domestic pricelevel for a
number of countries. The money supply could have been postulatedto
respond directly to output movements without affectingthe theoretical
results. This involves having the money supply respond to movementsof the
real exchange rate, instead of to the exchange rate and priceratio sepa-
6rately, and would constraina8 =-a9
anda11 =-a12.In this sense,
monetary policy that offsets exchange rate movementsand accommodates price
movements can be interpreted as attempting tostabilize output.
Frenkel (1983) has recently proposedthat, if the monetary authorities
wish to stabilize the exchangerate, they should have the money supply
respond to the interest rate as well as to the levelof the exchange rate.
He suggests that, if there isa combination of a high nominal interest rate
differential and a depreciation of thecurrency, the money supply should
not be increased but, if there isa combination of a high nominal interest
rate differential and an appreciation of thecurrency, then expansionary
monetary policy is appropriate. This argument is basedon the grounds that
the interest rate contains additionalinformation that is useful for
exchange rate stabilization.
In the context of our model, weinterpret Frenkel's proposal by
allowing the domestic and foreignmoney supplies to respond to the interest
rate differential. This allows themonetary authorities to use information
regarding the expected rate of depreciation (fromequation (3)) that is not
contained in the exchange rate or price level.A policy of accommodating
interest rate differentials requires
a10 and/or a13 >0;offsetting them
implies a10 and/ora13 <0.For example, if the domestic interestrate
increased relative to the foreign rate anda10 >0,the domestic money
supply would increase, requiring, by equation(1), the domestic rate to
decrease relative to the foreign rateto maintain asset market equilibrium.
Finally, the money supply rule for eachcountry includes an exogenous term
and a stochastic disturbance term.
Frenkel's proposal can be implementedby offsetting the exchange rate
and accommodating the interest ratedifferential in a particular manner.
7When the nominal interest rate differential is positive andthe exchange
rate appreciates, this policy increases the money supplywhatever the
magnitudes of the coefficients. On the other hand,the combination of a
positive nominal interest rate differential and a depreciationof the
currency requires that the coefficient onthe exchange rate (a8) be large
enough (in absolute value) so that the money supplydoes not increase. It
is interesting to note that this policy cannot be implemented solelyby
targeting the exchange rate or the interest ratedifferential. Accomrnodat-
ing a positive interest rate differential willincrease the money supply
regardless of the value of the exchange rate. Offsettingthe exchange
rate, without targeting the interest rate, impliesthat the money supply
will decrease in response to a depreciation. With a positiveinterest rate
differential, the combination policy will mitigate this decrease, producing
the desired result.
It is illustrative to compare this model to earlier work.If both
output and the domestic and foreign money supplies are exogenous,the
resultant model is that of Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982). If,in addition,
capital is perfectly mobile (a5 =0),the model becomes that of Dornbusch
(1976). Dornbusch's variable output case can be produced by allowing
output to be endogenous as in equation (2). Italso should be noted that,
in both Dornbusch (1976) and Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982) inflation depends
only on excess demand in the goods market (a7 =0).This, however, does
not affect the conditions for over— and undershooting.
III. Theoretical Results: Overshooting and Undershooting
In this section, we show how variable output, imperfect capital
mobility, and monetary policy that accommodates price and/oroffsets
interest rate movements can combine to produce exchange rate undershooting.
8Since any of the above three factors alonecan produce undershooting, the
focus of this section is to show their effectsin conjunction with one
another.
The clearest way to derive and illustrate theseresults is through a
deterministic specification with perfectforesight expectations. Assuming
that expectations are perfect foresight,setting the disturbances equal to













Some of the effects of using interest ratetargets for monetary policy can
be seen directly from (7). rf themoney supply accommodates the interest
rate differential, (a10,a13 >0),then monetary policy becomes more offset-
ting towards the exchange rate but more accommodativetowards prices. The
magnitude of these effects also depends on the degree ofcapital mobility.
If capital were perfectly mobile(a5 =0),interest rate targeting would
not affect the degree of accommodation.
It will prove useful to simplify the priceequation. Assuming the
Fisher relation for each country, where the realinterest rate equals the
nominal interest rate minus the expected rate ofinflation, remembering
that prices are predetermined, andsubstituting (3) into (4), we obtain:






















Substituting (2'), (3), and (7) into (1), taking deviations from
steady state equilibrium, and substituting into (4'), we obtain






























63 =d1d261 64 =d1
+
d262).
In order to illustrate the cases of over- and undershooting, we will
assume that the money supply either offsets or is not too accommodative of
exchange rate movements, so that >0.11We also assume, for the purpose
of illustration, that 63 >0and 64 <0so that the slope of the Dq =0
curve is positive.'2 The behavior of the model is now determined by the
income (a1) elasticity and the interest rate (a2) semi-elasticity of the
demand for money, the elasticity of demand for output with respect to
relative prices (d3), the degree of capital mobility (a5), and the degree
of accommodation of domestic (c2) and foreign (c4) monetary policy to price
movements.
Exchange rate oversflooting is illustrated in Figure•13 If output is
not too variable, capital not too immobile, and/or policy not too accommod-
ative, 62 >0.With both and 62 >0,the slope of the De =0schedule
is negative. An unanticipated, permanent increase in the exogenous compo-
nent of the domestic money supply, starting from a position of long run
10equilibrium (E), shifts theDet =0and the =0schedules to the right.
(To simplify the figures, the schedulesare drawn only after the distur-
bance occurs.) The motion of thevariables is indicated by the direction
of the arrows. The unique
perfect foresight equilibrium path, the saddle
path, is downward sloping. At the time of thedisturbance, the price
level, being predetermined, is fixed. Theexchange rate must jump (depre-
ciate) to E1 so as to be on the new saddlepath, and then appreciate along
the saddle path towards thenew long run equilibrium E2. Long run purchas-
ing power parity ensures thate =atboth the initial (E) and final
(E') equilibria.
Exchange rate undershooting occurs when, bysome combination of high
output variability, low capital mobility, andhigh monetary accommodation
to price movements, <0.With 61 >0and <0,it is shown in Figure
2 that the slopes of theDe =0curve and the saddle path are both posi-
tive. Following the increase in ii, theexchange rate depreciates to E1 and
continues to depreciate until thelong run equilibrium is attained at E2.
Since the intuition behind exchangerate undershooting caused by
flexible output or imperfect capitalmobility is familiar from Dornbusch
(1976) and Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982),we will focus on accomodative
monetary policy. Recall that accommodativemonetary policy involves both
accommodating prices and/or interest rates, so thatc2 and c4 >0.The
increase in the domestic steady statemoney supply ()increases,because
of the long run purchasingpower parity assumption, the steady state
exchange rate ()andprice ratio (i).Assumingthat both countries'
policies are accommodative, andremembering that prices are predetermined,
this causes the component of the domesticmoney supply that responds to
prices to decrease and the foreignmoney supply to increase. If capital
11were perfectly mobile (a5 =0)and output did not respond to relative
prices (d3 =0),undershooting would require c2 +C4 > 1.In that case, an
increase in the domestic steady state money supply causes adecrease in the
money supply ratio (mt -mt),
which is consistent with asset market
equilibrium only if the domestic interest rateexceeds the foreign interest
rate. This in turn requires expected (andactual by perfect foresight)
exchange rate depreciation, which impliesundershooting. Once
accommodative monetary policy is combined with variable outputand
imperfect capital mobility, theconditionSfor overshooting are greatly
relaxed. In particular, it is no longer necessarythat either the money
supply ratio decrease or that the domesticinterest rate exceed the foreign
interest rate to have undershooting.
Frenkel's (1983) proposal for accommodating interest ratedifferen-
tials and offsetting exchange rates can now beevaluated. Accommodating
interest rates acts to offset exchange rates andaccommodate prices, which
stabilizes the real exchange rate and output. Theaccommodation of prices
inherent in accommodating interest rates increasesthe likelihood of
undershooting. In addition, it is clear from (7)that accommodating
interest rates causes the money supply to accommodate expectedexchange
rate depreciation. This lowers 2 (in absolutevalue), decreasing the
magnitude of either overshooting or undershooting.In this manner, the
additional information contained in the interest rateis used to stabilize
the exchange rate.
IV. Empirical Results: Germany and Japan
The theory derived above relates exchange ratebehavior to activist
monetary policy, imperfect capital mobility,and variable output. In this
section, using quarterly data since the adventof generalized floating in
121973, the model is estimated for Germany andJapan. The empirical results
are consistent with overshooting for the mark andundershooting for the
yen.
The model is estimated by constrained maximumlikelihood techniques,
with the constraints on the parameters causedby the form of the structural
equations, assumption of rational expectations, and thestability Condition
necessary to achieve a unique solution. The policy(a8 -a13)
and struc-.
tural (a1 -
a7)coefficients are jointly estimated. Combined with the
imposition of rational expectations, this satisfiesseveral aspects of
Lucas' (1976) critique of econometric policyevaluation. Using likelihood
ratio tests, the constrained model cannot berejected at standard signifi—
cance levels for either country, although the evidence isstronger for
Japan than for Germany.
Estimation of the model first requiresderiving the reduced form.
Substituting equations as in the perfect foresightsolution, and interpret-
ing all variables as deviations from their longrun equilibrium values, we
obtain:
(9) =Ii
+1 62 1 e +uitl
























where the u's are combinations of the c's.
rn order to derive the reduced form, theerror terms must be finite
moving average processes. We assume that they aregenerated by first order
autoregressive processes, i.e., =au1
+jt'j=1,...,6, where the
13'i!'s are serially uncorrelated. We then take the infinite moving average
representation implicit in the above autoregressive processand truncate it
appropriately.14 Assuming that expectations are determined rationally and





where A and B are 2x2 matrices.
The model to be estimated consists of equations (10) -(14).The
elements of A and B are non-linear combinations of the 6'sand the ct's.
The v's are combinations of the 'Y's, written so as to makethe zero lag
coefficient matrix the identitymatrix.16 By truncating the implicit
moving average representation of the disturbances atthird order for u1 and
fourth order for the others, a first order autoregressive fourthorder
moving average model is derived. Maximum likelihoodestimates (conditional
on the initial disturbances being set equal to zero) areobtained under the
assumption that (v1v2u3tu4tustu6t)' is multivariatenormal.
As described above, the model is estimated for Germanyand Japan,
using quarterly data for 1973 (II) -(1981)(IV).17 We use the effective
exchange rate (MERM) calculated by the International MonetaryFund. Real
GNP (or GDP) is used to measure output, MI for the money supply,the GNP
deflator for the price level, and representative three month moneymarket
rates for the interest rate. The foreign variables wereconstructed by
taking weighted averages, with the weights takenfrom those used to con-
struct the MERMrates.18
The large number of structural and policy parameters (13)relative to
the sample size (35) caused us to take several steps to limitthe number of
parameters to be estimated. One, described above, wasto specify the error
14terms as first order autoregressions. Anotherwas to estimate the money
market equilibrium equation (1) bya single equation method,19 and then use
the estimates from this regressionas constants for the constrained maximum
likelihood estimates. This enabledus to get estimates of the income
elasticity and the interest rate semi-elasticity of thedemand for money
directly from data on income and interest rates, andto reduce the number
of parameters to be estimated by maximum likelihood.20
The maximum likelihood estimates of thestructural (a3 -a7),policy
(a8 -a13),and serial correlation(a1 —a6) parametersare given in Table
1 along with their asymtotic st-ratios," theratio of the coefficients to
their standard errors computed from the inverseof the second derivative
matrix of the likelihood function. Singleequation estimates fora1 and
a2, as well as parameter values for the reduced form coefficients implied
by the estimates (c's, d's and cS's) are alsopresented. For Japan, allow-
ing the domestic and foreign money supplies torespond to the interest rate
differential added virtually no explanatorypower to the model; the results
presented constraina10 and a13 to equal zero. For Germany, on the other
hand, allowing the money supplies torespond to the interest rate differen-
tial was quite important.
The most important aspect to the estimates isthat is positive for
Germany and negative for Japan, implying exchange rateovershooting for the
mark and undershooting for the yen.21 Domestic
(a9) and foreign (a12)
monetary policy that accommodates prices, output(d3) that responds to
relative price movements, and imperfectcapital mobility (a5) all contrib-
ute towards undershooting for Japan.It is interesting to note that, while
neither accommodative monetary policy,imperfect capital mobility, nor
variable output were, by themselves, sufficientto produce undershooting,
15any two of the above three factorswould suffice. The combination of all
three, of course, strengthens the case for undershooting.
Exchange rate overshooting for Germany iscaused by a number of
factors, the most important of which being thatGerman monetary policy
strongly offsets price movements. Even though foreign monetarypolicy is
accommodative, the combination (c2 +c4)
is offsetting. In addition, the
relative price elasticity of output (d3) is negative,which also contrib—
u.tes to overshooting.22 While capital mobilityis imperfect, it is not
sufficiently imperfect to outweigh these other factorsand produce under-
shooting.23
More support for the over and undershootingresults comes from es-
timating a htsemi_constrainedli version of themodel. In this version,
and are estimated directly, rather than being impliedby the structural
and policy coefficients. All of the other coefficientsof the model are
estimated as in the constrained version above. Thisenables us to test the
overshooting hypothesis directly by examining the signand significance
level of The results of this procedure support the resultsfound
above, with 52 equaling 3.84 (2.77) for Germanyand -.67 (-1.81) for Japan,
(asymptotic "t-ratios11 are in parentheses).This indicates that not only
does the mark exhibit overshooting and the yenundershooting, but that
these results are significant. The values of are .76(2.09) for Germany
and 1.03(2.76) for Japan, indicating that the stabilitycondition is
sufficient to provide a unique solution. The structural, policy,and
serialcorrelation coefficients (not reported) are verysimilar to those of
the constrained model. Another piece of evidenceinsupportof these
resultsis found by examining the correlation between eand q, which is
positive (.22) for Japan and negative (-.20)for Germany. This is
16consistent, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, both withundershooting for
Japan and overshooting for Germany.24
The empirical results illustratea number of facets of the model.
Imperfect capital mobility is stronglysupported, with a5 positive and
significant for both countries. The coefficienton the real interest rate
differential in the price adjustmentequation (a7) is positive and signifi-
cant for both countries. The coefficienton relative prices (a6) is
positive for Japan and negative for Germany. Forthe single equation
estimates, the income elasticities and interest ratesemi—elasticities of
the demand for money are of theexpected signs and magnitudes. Finally,
the correlations between the actual andestimated parameter values are
quite high for Japan and lower for Germany.
More formal support for the model isprovided by the likelihood ratio
test. The model is compared to an "unconstrainedversion, which imposes
the same policy equations (12-13) andserial correlation structure as the
"constrained" version described above, but doesnot impose the forms of the
structural equations or the rationalexpectations restrictions. Using the
likelihood ratio test, we cannot reject theconstrained model at the 50
percent level for Japan or at the 10 percent level for Germany.5This is
in contrast to previous work for thecurrent flexible exchange rate period,
such as the models of Driskill and Sheffrin(1981), Glaessner (1982a), and
Papell (1983), which are all rejected by the likelihoodratio or chi—
squared test. These results alsocompare favorably with the results of the
likelihood ratio tests performed bySargent (1978) and Taylor (1980) for
closed economy models. They providequite strong confirmation that the
data does not contain too much evidenceagainst the model.
The estimates reported above are conditionalon the single equation
17estimates of the money demand parameters.We also estimated the model with
all of the parameters estimated by maximumlikelihood. These results are
reported in Table 2. For Japan, theincome elasticity of the demand for
money (a1) decreases whilethe interest rate semi-elasticitY (a2)does not
change. Both parameters, however, becomeinsignificant. There is little
change in either the levels or significanceof the other parameters and
virtually no change in the s's. Neitherthe finding of undershooting nor
the support of the estimates by thelikelihood ratio test are affected.
Both a1 and a2 increase and are significantfor Germany. The other
parameters change more, but not verymuch more, than they do for Japan and
there is not much change in the s. The findingof overshooting is not
affected. The results of the likelihood ratiotest are slightly worse.
The constrained model can now not be rejected onlyat the 5 percent level,
although it comes very close to not beingrejected at the 10 percent
level.26 The support given to undershooting for Japan and overshootingfor
Germany by the semi-constrained model, reportedabove, is not affected
because the estimates of the semi-constrainedmodel do not involve the
money demand parameters.En summary, the model with all of the parameters
estimated by maximum likelihood gives virtuallythe same results as the
model with a1 and a2 estimated by a single equationmethod.
The final estimates of the model are prompted bythe fact that, for
Japan, the serial correlationcoefficients for the exchange rate (c) and
price (a2) equations are quite high,with >i.27In order to attempt to
reduce these, we estimate the model usingfirst-differeflCed, rather than
detrended, data. These results are reportedin Table 3 with all of the
parameters estimated by maximumlikelihood. Although the levels and
significance of the coefficients changeconsiderably, the basic result,that the yen exhibits undershooting, is notaffected. Estimation of the
semi-constrained model using first-differenced datasupports the finding of
undershooting.28 The major improvement inthe results comes from the
estimation of the unconstrained model.Using the likelihood ratio test,
the constrained model cannot be rejected at the99 percent level.29 This
is a very strong result, especially in contrastto the previous work cited
above.
30
In addition to Germany and Japan, weattempted, without much success,
to estimate the model for the United States and theUnited Kingdom. For
the United States, although the coefficientswere all of the expected sign
and magnitude, very few were significant and theconstrained model clearly
failed the likelihood ratio test. For the UnitedKingdom, we were not even
able to get the estimates toconverge. One plausible explanation for these
unsuccessful estimates is that, for the United States andthe United
Kingdom, the money supply rule changed during theperiod to become less
accommodative.3' Compared to thechange in monetary policy with the advent
of the Thatcher government in May, 1979 in theUnited Kingdom or the change
in the Federal Reserve Board'soperating procedure in October, 1979 in the
United States, no such dramatic change has occurredin Germany or Japan.
We conclude by looking at the estimatedpolicy parameters in the
context of Frenkel's proposal, concentrating, sinceJapanese monetary
policy was not responsive to interest rates, on the results forGermany.
As described above, Frenkel's proposal is formonetary policy to accommo-
date the interest rate differential and offset theexchange rate. While
German monetary policy did accommodate interestrate movements, it also
accommodated the exchange rate.In response to the combination of a
positive interest rate differential and a depreciation of theDeutsche Mark
19(above the steady state), the German money supply increases (relativeto
trend). Frenkel's policy would have it stay constant or contract.In the
context of our model, implementation of Frenkel's proposalfor Germany
would not alter the overshooting result. Exchange rate overshooting(or
undershooting) is caused by the combination of capital mobility, output
variability, and the responsiveness of monetary policy to prices(directly
or through the interest rate differential). SinceGerman monetary policy
already accommodates the interest rate differential,the overshooting
result is invariant to whether or not, in addition, it offsets exchange
rate movements.
V.Conclusions and Extensions
This paper has shown how, in the context of a model with slow price
adjustment, imperfect capital mobility, variable output,and activist
monetary policy can combine to produce exchange rateundershooting. It
also provides evidence that, for the period of generalized floatingsince
1973, the mark exhibited overshooting and the yenexhibited undershooting.
The estimation is quite successful, in contrast with mostmodels of ex-
change rate determination for the same time period.
Possible extensions of the model are stimulated as much by ourfail-
ures as our successes. While we were not able to producesatisfactory
estimates for the United States or the United Kingdom, we can conjecture
that this was caused, at least in part, by the dramatic shifttowards less
accommodative monetary policy in both countries. We intend to testfor
changes in the conduct of monetary policy by estimatingthe model over
various sub-periods. Our model predicts that a less accommodative monetary
policy will increase exchange rate overshooting ordecrease undershooting.
We hope to investigate whether the recent changes in exchangerate
20variability for the United States and the UnitedKingdom can be accounted
for by changes in the conduct ofmonetary policy.32
21Footnotes
1Glaessner (1982b) and Meese and Rogoff (1981) discuss this in detail.
2Mussa (1982) argues that the appropriate deflator for nominal bal-
ances is a weighted average of domesticand foreign goods price levels
(denominated in domestic currency). This complicatesbut does not substan-
tially affect the theoretical results. In addition, asshown by Flood
(1981), if the income elasticity of the demand for moneyis equal to unity
equation (1) would be unchanged under the Mussaformulation.
3Frankel (1979) and Driskill and Sheffrin (1981) make the same assump-
tion, which seems to be unavoidable without greatlycomplicating the model.
41t is necessary to equate the real interest rate semi-elasticities of
output demand in the two countries (a-)in order for the model to be
tractable. Allowing lags in the outpt equation producesanother differ-
ence equation, which greatly complicatesthe model.
5Weusea flow capital mobility specification,while recognizing its
deficiencies, to limit the model to a system of two firstorder difference
equations. Modeling imperfect capital mobility as astock adjustment
process produces a much more complicatedmodel, one which cannot be solved
analytically, Allowing the current account toalso depend on the interest
rate differential does not affect the results.
6Mussa (1981a,1982) argues that a superior formulation to Dornbusch's
price equation would have the rate ofinflation equal the expected rate of
change of the equilibrium price level, plus some proportion(<1) of the
difference between the equilibrium and the actual pricelevel. As em-
phasized both by Mussa and by Obstfeld and Rogoff(1983), Dornbusch's price
equation is inappropriate either when disturbancesbecome anticipated long
before they occur or when the long run equilibriumof the economy moves
over time. Neither situation is consideredin this paper.
7Both Dornbusch's and Mussa's formulations assume that prices are
predetermined. Assuming that prices are perfectlyflexible, so that
purchasing power parity holds at all times,does not accord with evidence
from the 197Os. The recent work of Flood and Hodrick(1982), in which
prices are neither flexible nor predetermined,provides another alternative
for future empirical research.
8Allowing the money supply to depend on contemporaneous, rather than
past, values of the variables greatly simplifiesthe analysis. For the
theory, assuming perfect foresight, thisis equivalent to having the money
supply depend on expectations of the currentvalues of the variables,
conditional on information available at the end of the previousperiod.
9Our definition of accommodative, while clear with regard to domestic
price moments, may cause some semanticdifficulties in considering foreign
price movements. In some of the discussionof supply shocks, an increase
in the foreign price level (price of the imported good)would cause the
22domestic price index to increase. In thatcontext, accommodative monetary
policy implies that the domestic money supply increases when theforeign price level increases. In our context, accommodativemonetary policy
implies that the domestic money supply decreases when theforeign price level increases.
10The only tractableway to accomplish this is to assume that the
domestic and foreign money supplies respondidentically to price movements,
an assumption that does not seem tenable.
11By "themoney supply" we mean the sum of the coefficients of the
domestic and foreign money supplies. Thepossibility that ô<0which can
lead to a non-unique solution, will be consideredin a subseuent paper.
12The over- andundershooting results are invariant to the slope of the Dq =0curve, which is drawn to be positive and less than unity solely
for eae of illustration. With Dornbusch'sprice adjustment formulation
(a7 =0),the SiOC of the Dq 0 schedule would be unity(3 =-4)and
the figures would replicate (ith theaxes reversed) those found in Frenkel
and Rodriguez (1982).
13While thesediagrams are more familiar in continuous time, Mussa
(1982) uses them in a discrete time model. Wepresent the theoretical
results in discrete time for thepurpose of comparison with the empirical
work.
14Werepresent the errors as first order autoregressiveprocesses, rather than higher order movingaverage processes, in order to limit the
number of parameters to be estimated.
15me modelcould, of course, have been solved by other methods. The
derivation of (14) is straightforward but lengthy, andtherefore not
presented.
16We do notimpose the cross error constraints on the v's. Otherwise,
there would be cross correlationamong the errors and the estimates would
be inconsistent.
17The end ofour sample period was caused by data availability when
the paper was first written.
18The interestrates used for the estimation were representativemoney market rates, taken from World Financial Markets. Allother data were
taken from International Financial Statistics. The realoutput, price
level, and money supply data were seasonally adjusted. In orderto achieve
stationarity, all variables, after taking logarithms (except for the
interest rate), were detrended by regressionon a constant and linear time
trend. The countries used for constructing theforeign variables were
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, andthe United
States, with the weights proportional to the MERMweights.
19We used the AR1procedure of TSP, which 5rovides efficient estimates
of an equation whose disturbances display first orderserial correlation.
23procedure raises two questions regarding consistency of the
estimates. On one hand, estimating the money demand coefficients by a
single equation method may introduce inconsistency into the model.On the
other hand, if these parameters are still inconsistently estimated when
estimated by maximum likelihood, then the inconsistency would be spread
throughout the model. Another problem with our procedure is that,because
for the maximum likelihood procedure it is assumed that a1 and a9 are
estimated without error, the standard errors of the other variables are
biased downward. We report estimates where all of the parameters are
estimated by maximum likelihood below.
21Dornbusch's concept of overshooting describes the behavior of the
exchange rate after a permanent increase in the money supply while,for the
empirical work, all disturbances are temporary. In this context, over—
shooting is interpreted as the existence of estimated parametervalues such
that, in the deterministic model, a permanent increase in the money supply
would cause the exchange rate to overshoot.
22Bothd3 and dA are negative for Germanybecause a4, the real inter-
est rate semi-elastiity of output demand, is negative. This, of course,
does not accord with the theory.In an earlier version of this paper, we
estimated the model with aA constrained to equal zero, In that version, a3
was negative. This issue Ts explored at greater length, but no more
satisfactorily, in Papell (1983).
Papeli (1983), we estimate a similar model (with perfect capital
mobility) for the Deutsche Mark/Dollar exchange rate. While American
monetary policy is accommodative of prices, German monetary policyis
sufficiently offsetting to produce overshooting. These results are consis-
tent with the findings for Germany in this paper.
24The value of(53 implied by the estimates was quiteclose to zero for
both countries. This could be illustrated with a vertical
=0schedule
in the figures.
25Let L(u) be the log of the likelihood function for the unconstrained
model, L(c) the log of the likelihood function for the constrainedmodel, u
the number of parameters estimated for the unconstrained model, and c the
number of parameters estimated for the constrained model. Then
2[L(u)—L(c)] is distributed chi-squared (u—c). There are 22 parameters in




The unconstrained log likelihood for Japan is 575.804: thus
=3.682.The unconstrained log likelihood for Germany is 638.487:
2[L(u)—L(c)] =7.348.With u-c =5for both countries, the constrained
model cannot be rejected at the 50 percent level for Japan or at the 10
percent level for Germany.
26Using the notation in footnote 25, with u—c =3for both countries,
2[L(u) —L(c)]equals 2.278 for Japan and 6.462 for Germany. The 10
percent marginal significance level is 6.251.
27Allowing the third order moving average process u1.f. to be represent-
ed by a second order autoregression or a third order movt'1g average,
instead of the first order autoregression adopted in the paper, does not
24affect this result.
286equals 11.35 (93.21) and 62equals-11.69 (-76.12). Asymtotic
"t—ratio" are in parentheses.
29The log likelihood of theunconstrained model is 518.928, so that
2[L(u) —L(c)]=.098.
30We experimented withestimating a model using first-differenced data
for Germany, even though the serial correlation coefficientsusing detrend-
ed data were not overly high. The precision of the estimates of the
parameters decreased, and the constrained model was rejected when compared
to the unconstrained model by the likelihood ratio test.
31For the UnitedKingdom, other changes during the period include the
relaxation of capital controls and exploitation of North Sea oil.Haache
and Townend (1981), using single equation estimationtechniques, are
unsuccessful at modeling sterling's effective exchange rate for 1972-80.
preliminary attempt to accomplish this, using considerations of
exchange risk not present in this paper, is made for the United States in
Papell (1983b).
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Constrained Maximum Likelihood Estimates
-Estimate t Statistic Estimate t statistic
.82 5.63
—.67 —2.91 —.43 —1.81

























Constrained Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Asymptotic Asymptotic
Parameter Estimate "t-ratio" Estimate "t-ratio"
a .26 .38 3.36 3.94 a .66 1.16 2.69 8.45
.17 1.00 .05 .55 a .56 1.29 -.74 -6.82
.80 2.15 .85 3.88
.08 2.12 -.03 -1.48 a .26 2.14 .06 2.44 a —.01 -.05 .20 .92 a .66 4.05 -4.12 -1.66
1.19 1.38
—.13 -1.80 .09 .23 a .17 1.54 4.12 2.60 a —1.07. —2.11
1.06 8.95 .47 5.44
.76 9.19 -.11 —2.48
.60 6.17 .64 9.87
.33 2.63 .69 19.13
.74 10.15 .84 13.85
.43 3.35 .63 9.92








c' 3.21 d .39 .02 d .35 .06
d .84 -.59
d4 .76 -.78










Estimates with First-Differenced Data
Japan









































CorrelationBetween Actual and Estimated Values
e .52
q .66
m .13
.10
yy* .27
i—it 49
Log Likelihood
5 18.879
30e e=q
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q
q
E
Li
De
Figure 1
e e=c
De=O